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I. INTRODUCTION
While placing a monetary value on a product or service seems
natural in many areas of society, it presents new challenges when
introduced into the reproductive arena.' Society has confronted a
similar debate before. Life insurance was once viewed as a form
of trafficking in human lives. 2 The acceptance of valuation in this
and other areas represents a shift in cultural values that must
now confront birthing arrangements. 3
The emergence of new reproductive technologies has ushered
in new possibilities not only for women unable to bear children,
but also for women willing to bear children for another, and for
individuals interested in facilitating the introduction of these two
groups for a profit.
One product of this new technology,
gestational surrogacy, has forced society to reconsider established
notions about the beginning of life and the identity of the
biological mother. In so doing, it has brought into question the
ethics of paying women to bear children and the potential for
exploiting surrogates through those payments.
Faced with
international gestational surrogacy arrangements and no
corresponding policy to address them, the need for a
comprehensive policy is exigent.
Part II of this Note describes the role of gestational surrogacy
within the framework of new reproductive technologies. In Part
III, a discussion of the international response to gestational
surrogacy highlights the domestic approaches various countries
have taken to control surrogacy arrangements within their
borders (and notes those countries having no policies at all). A
review of the transnational challenges presented by gestational

surrogacy

follows in

Part IV,

which

cites

examples

of

multinational surrogacy arrangements and addresses arguments
both for and against enforcing these arrangements.
Part V
suggests an international approach to regulating gestational
surrogacy based on rights and principles set forth in existing
conventions and declarations.

1.
See CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER 159 (1989). Shalev notes that many
areas of social activity have placed prices on human lives, including tort law,
motor vehicle design, medical research, and military tactics. See id.
2.
3.

See &L
See id.
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II. GESTATIONAL SURROGACY

Surrogacy has long been an alternative for women unable to
bear children. 4 Until recently, however, surrogacy never
challenged the principle that a woman and the child to whom she
gives birth share the same genetic material. Recent advances in
reproductive technology shatter this traditional notion by making
it possible for a woman to bear a child to whom she has no
genetic link. s The modern contracts between surrogate mothers
and commissioning parents have become a market-driven event
that is much more complicated than simply bringing a new life
6
into the world.
A. PossibilitiesRaised by New Reproductive Technologies
Some believe that the motivation to become a parent and
have biological children is one of the most fundamental desires of
human beings. 7 For those unable to conceive, adoption
traditionally has been the only alternative.8 The lengthy process
of adoption, combined with the shortage of children available to
9
adopt, however, has made it less than the ideal solution.
Although the lack of children available for adoption may be one of
the driving forces behind the increased interest in surrogacy,
parents' desires for a genetic link with their children makes
surrogacy attractive in its own right.1 0 The erosion of traditional
notions about the structure of the family and the strides in

reproductive techniques also contribute to the popularity of
11

surrogacy.

4.
5.
6.

See infranotes 18-20 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.B.

7.

See Keith J. Hey, Assisted Conception and Surrogacy-Unfinished

Business, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 775, 776 (1993).

8.

See id. at 777.

9.
See id.; Richard A. Posner, The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing
Contractsof SurrogateMotherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 21, 22 (1989).
10.
See Hey, supra note 7, at 777; Beverly Horsburgh, Jewish Women,
Black Women: GuardingAgainst the Oppressionof Surrogacy,8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 29, 39 n.33 (1993); Posner, supranote 9, at 22.
11.
See Posner, supranote 9, at 22. See generally Thomas H. Murray, New
Reproductive Technologies and the Family, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIEs 51, 6068 (Cynthia B. Cohen ed., 1996) (arguing that commercial surrogacy illustrates
the opposition between family values and new reproductive technologies).
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Recent advances in reproductive technology have afforded
new opportunities to couples who have difficulty conceiving. 12
Means of assisted reproduction are used most frequently with
couples who are infertile 13 or have difficulty conceiving or
gestating a child, including women who have no uterus, have
miscarried, or have conditions such as hypertension and diabetes
that could be worsened by pregnancy. 14 Surrogacy also affords
parenting opportunities to women who suffer from illnesses, such
as phenylketonuria (PKU), or HIV or AIDS, that could damage the
fetus either during gestation or the birthing process.1 s Less than
twenty years ago, women facing such problems could either adopt
a child or remain childless. 16 However, women now have the
benefit of assistive techniques such as artificial insemination, in
vitro fertilization, cryopreservation, and surrogacy.1 7
B. What is GestationalSurrogacy?

Surrogacy traces its origin back to Biblical times.1 s Sarah,
who was barren, asked her husband, Abraham, to lie with her
Egyptian handmaid, Hagar, so they could establish a family
through her.1 9 Likewise, when Rachel and Leah were unable to

12.

See John Parsons, Assisted Conception: The State of the Art, in

CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW AND PRACTICE OF ASSISTED PROCREATION 15,
15-27 (Donald Evans ed., 1996) [hereinafter CREATING THE CHILD]. See generally

Laura R. Woliver, Reproductive Technologies, Surrogacy Arrangements, and the
Politics of MAotherhood, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD 346, 346-59 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel

Karpin eds., 1995) (discussing the feminist view of the impact of new reproductive
technologies) [hereinafter MOTHERS INLAW].
13.
An infertile couple is defined as one which does not conceive after
twelve months of unprotected intercourse. See Parsons, supranote 12, at 15.
14.
See Gian Carlo Di Renzo et al., Control of Human Reproduction: A
Clinical Perspective on BioethicialProblems, in CREATING THE CHILD, supranote 12,
at 29, 38.
15.
See Bernard Dickens, Canada: The Ontario Law Reform Commission
Project on Human Artificial Reproduction, in LAW REFORM AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION
47, 87-88 (Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 1992).
16.
See Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy:A Last ResortAlternativefor Infertile
Women or a Commodifwcation of Women's Bodies and Children?, 12 WIS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 113, 113 (1997).
17.
See Parsons, supranote 12, at 16-25.
18.
See JULIA J. TATE, SURROGACY: WHAT PROGRESS SINCE HAGAR,
BILHAH, AND ZILPAHI 1 (1995); Kenneth Norrie, United Kingdom: Legal
Regulation of Human Reproduction, in LAW REFORM AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION,
supra note 15, at 201, 208-09; Erika Hessenthaler, Gestational Surrogacy:
Legal Implications of Reproductive Technology, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 169, 170
(1995).
19.
See Genesis 16:1-2 (King James).
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bear children, they gave their maids to their husbands to bear
children for them. 20 These slave women gave birth to children for
their mistresses involuntarily, receiving no payment for their
efforts. 2 1 Some suggest that the role of the surrogate now, as in
22
Biblical times, is still primarily occupied by women of color.
Although there are various types of surrogate mothers, all are
women who bear a child for someone else.23
As opposed to
traditional or genetic surrogacy, in which a woman gives birth to
a child formed from her own egg, gestational surrogacy involves a
woman giving birth to a child formed from the fertilized egg of
another woman. 24 In gestational surrogacy, a woman's own eggs
are retrieved and fertilized with sperm in a laboratory, and the
resulting embryos are implanted in the uterus of another woman
who then bears the child.2 5 In traditional surrogacy, then, the
surrogate bears a child with a genetic link to only one of the

Now Sarai Abram's wife bare him no children: and she had an handmaid,
an Egyptian, whose name was Hagar. And Sarai said unto Abram, Behold
now, the Lord hath restrained me from bearing: I pray thee, go in unto my
maid; it may be that I may obtain children by her.
It.

See generally Baruch Brody, Current Religious Perspectives on the New

Reproductive Techniques, in BEYOND BABY M 45, 45-64 (Dianne M. Bartels et al.
eds., 1990) (describing the current position of specific religious communities on
the use of new reproductive technologies).
20.
See Genesis 30:1-4, 9-10 (King James). "And she said, Behold my
maid Bilhah, go in unto her; and she shall bear upon my knees, that I may also
have children by her." Id. at 3. "When Leah saw that she had left bearing, she
took Zilpah her maid, and gave her Jacob to wife." Id. at 9.
21.
See TATE, supranote 18, at 1.
22.
See Sherrie Lynne Russell-Brown, Parental Rights and Gestational
Surrogacy: An Argument Against the Genetic Standard, 23 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L.
REV. 525, 542-43 (1992).
23.
See GREGORY E. PENCE, CLASSIC CASES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 120 (2d ed.
1995). The American Bar Association's proposed Model Surrogacy Act defines a
surrogate as the "gestational carrier of an embryo, a fetus, or a child." A.B.A.,
Model Surrogacy Act § 2(g), in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 270, 271 (Larry Gostin
ed., 1990). While "surrogate" may also be used to describe a woman who raises a
child for someone else, this Note will refer to "surrogate" as someone who bears a
child for another.
24.
See PENCE, supra note 23, at 121. One woman's egg is fertilized in
vitro and then implanted in the surrogate's womb. See id.; see also CHERYL L.
MEYER, THE WANDERING UTERUS: POLITICS AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS OF WOMEN
70 (1997). Meyer notes that traditional surrogacy is also referred to as "partial
surrogacy" because the surrogate supplies the egg and is therefore "partially" the
mother.
See Meyer, supra. Gestational surrogacy is also known as "full
surrogacy" since the surrogate gestates the fetus but has no genetic connection to
it. See id.
25.
See MEYER, supra note 24, at 70; Third-Party Parentingwith In Vitro
Fertilization Turns Back the Biological Clock, Canada Newswire, July 16, 1992,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CNW File.
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donors, the husband,2 6 while in gestational surrogacy, the
surrogate bears a child genetically related to both donors. 27
Surrogacy can be motivated by either commercial or altruistic
impulses. 28 While a commercial surrogate receives payment for
donating her egg or gestating the fetus, an altruistic surrogate
29
donates her egg or gestates the fetus as a gift.

Gestational surrogacy involves a written contract whereby the
surrogate agrees to carry the fetus to term and give birth to the
child, thereafter relinquishing her parental rights to the
"commissioning" mother or couple. 30 The fee typically paid to a
surrogate in the U.S. is ten thousand dollars,3 1 in addition to
payment for other expenses such as-life and disability insurance,
medical bills, maternity clothes, and transportation.3 2 For those
who use the services of a surrogacy brokerage agency in making
their arrangements, the cost of participation is usually twenty
thousand to thirty-five thousand dollars,3 with some fees
running more than fifty thousand dollars per child.3 4 Despite the
fact that these contracts describe the "service" the surrogate will
perform, the commissioning individuals are typically required to

26.

See Di Renzo, supranote 14, at 39.

27.
See Dianne M. Bartels, Surrogacy Arrangements, in BEYOND BABY M,
supra note 19, at 173, 175. Most individuals who choose to raise children prefer
to have a biological child, meaning that the parents will not only have a genetic
link with their child, but will also be able to participate in the process of
pregnancy and childbirth. See LAURA M. PURDY, REPRODUCING PERSONS 80 (1996);
Barbara J. Berg, Listening to the Voices of the Infertile, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS,
AND THE LAW 80, 81 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995).
28.
See PENCE, supranote 23, at 121.
29.
See id.
30.
See di Renzo, supranote 14, at 38.
31.
See Bartels, supra note 27, at 176; Ruth Macklin, What is Wrong with
CommodigfcationP, in NEw WAYS OF MAKING BABIES, supra note 11, at 106, 111
(Macklin does not believe that $10,000 is an adequate fee for surrogacy.).
32.
See Susan A. Ferguson, Surrogacy Contracts in the 1990's: The
Controversy and Debate Continues, 33 DuQ. L. REv. 903, 904 n.11 (1995). Life
and disability insurance reduces the financial risk of the commissioning parents
by protecting the gestational surrogate in the event she is injured either by the
fertility procedures or the pregnancy. See David E. Loder & Lisa W. Clark, In
GestationalSurrogacy,All PartiesMust BearRisk, NATL L.J., Sept. 9, 1996, at B7.
33.
See Bartels, supranote 27, at 176.
34.
See Maureen Downey, A Site for Surrogacy, ATLANTA J. & CONST., July
22, 1997, at IC, available in LEXIS, NEwS Library, ATLJNL File. The £35,000£40,000 (roughly $58,000-$66,000) fee to one surrogacy center brealks down as
follows: £9,000 ($15,000) to the surrogacy agency; £10,000 ($16,500) for medical
expenses, including doctors, labs, and fertility drugs; £10,000 ($16,500) to the
surrogate mother; £4,000 ($6,500) to psychologists; £3,000 ($5,000) to lawyers;
£500 ($800) for court fees; £2,000 ($3,000) for insurance costs. See Jo Revill, In
Whirls the Man Who Will Sell You a Baby for Pounds 40,000, EVENING STANDARD
(London), Jan. 28, 1997, at 18, availablein LEXIS, NEwS Library, TXTNWS File.

1999]

GESTATIONAL SURROGACY

277

does not
pay only ten percent of the total fee if the surrogate
35
provide them with a live infant from the pregnancy.
In return for this compensation, the surrogate is expected to
meet certain obligations, usually relating to specific conduct both
during and after pregnancy.3 6 During pregnancy, the gestational
surrogate usually agrees to include the intended parents in her
obstetrical visits, to consider an abortion if fetal abnormalities are
detected, and to allow the intended parents to be present during
the delivery. 3 7
In addition, the agreement may require the
gestational surrogate to refrain from smoking, consuming alcohol,
or using unnecessary drugs during the pregnancy.38
After
pregnancy, gestational surrogacy contracts require the surrogate,
as well as her husband if she is married, to surrender all parental
rights to the child and to allow the intended parents to take
custody of the child at birth.3 9 To facilitate this transfer of
custody, the agreement may require the surrogate to assist the
intended parents, through the adoption process, in obtaining a
birth certificate naming the intended parents as the legal parents
40
if they are not so named on the birth certificate.
The typical traditional or genetic surrogate is a white woman

between twenty-six and twenty-eight years old who is married and
has had a prior pregnancy. 4 1 Fewer than thirty-five percent of
those interested in serving as surrogates have attended college,
and sixty-six percent earn an annual income of less than thirty

35.
See Carol Tower, Essential Ethical Considerationsfor Public Policy on
Assisted Reproduction, in BEYOND BABY M, supra note 19, at 80, 81.
The
agreement in In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), for example, lrovided that
the surrogate was to receive $10,000 for bearing a child for the commissioning
parents. See Janna C. Merrick, The Case of Baby M, in BEYOND BABY M, supra
note 19, at 183, 185. The surrogate would not receive any compensation if she
miscarried prior to the fifth month of pregnancy, and she would receive $1000 if
she miscarried after that time, or if the baby was stillborn. See id.
36.
See R. Alta Charo, Legislative Approaches to Surrogate Motherhood, in
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD, supra note 23, at 88, 93-94; Loder & Clark, supranote
32, at B7. Enforcement of such behavioral restrictions is difficult, however, since
it is not feasible to continually monitor a surrogate's behavior. See id.
Furthermore, it would be troublesome to assess damages for minor breaches of
behavioral restrictions, and specific performance may be constitutionally barred
by a woman's right to privacy, personal autonomy, and bodily integrity. See id.
37.
See Loder & Clark, supranote 32, at B7.
38.
See id. Some courts have held that, in addition to refraining from
certain harmful behaviors, a surrogate may also have a duty to take affirmative
steps to prevent harm, such as undergoing a Cesarean section. See Charo, supra
note 36, at 93.
39.
See Loder & Clark, supranote 32, at B7.
40.
See id.
41.
See Charo, supra note 36, at 89. Approximately sixty percent are
married and forty percent have either never been married or are divorced. See id.
at 90.
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thousand dollars. 4 2 The typical proffie of those seeking to hire a
surrogate is a white married person in his or her late thirties or
early forties. 4A Most are more financially stable and better
educated than the surrogates they hire, with approximately sixtyfour percent of commissioning parents having a household
income of over fifty thousand dollars-fifty-four percent having
attended graduate school and another thirty-seven percent having
attended college."
With the new developments in reproductive technologies that
make gestational surrogacy possible, however, come an array of
social, ethical, and legal dilemmas. Two concerns raised by
gestational surrogacy are commercialization and exploitation.
Commercialization is an opposition to a surrogacy arrangement in
which the surrogate receives any type of compensation for her
services. 45 Exploitation, in contrast, is the idea that women are
forced into serving as surrogates because of their low economic
status, or are paid too little for their services. 4 6
III. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
Regulation of surrogacy arrangements varies considerably from
nation to nation, both in content and in quickness of response.
While the United States has not adopted any national surrogacy
legislation, 4 7 other nations have appointed task forces which have
already completed extensive studies of the issue. Of these nationwide
regulations, some reflect policies aimed at restricting surrogate
arrangements"5 while others represent controlled endorsements of
the practice and attempt to define its acceptable boundaries. 49
A. The United States
In 1987, a United States court considered for the first time, in
the case of In re Baby M,50 a surrogate motherhood contract.5 1

42.
43.
44.

See id. at 89.
See id at 88.
See id at 89.
See PENCE, supranote 23, at 121; see also Macklin, supranote 31, at

47.
48.

See discussion infra Part I.A.
See discussion infra Part lIM.B.

45.
115 (referring to commercial surrogacy as commodification).
46.
See PENCE, supra note 23, at 139; see also Macklin, supra note 31, at
111.
49.
50.
51.
the Baby

See discussion infra Part III.C.
537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
See BEYOND BABY M, supra note 19, at 263, 263-68 app. (reproduction of
M surrogate parenting agreement); Ian McCallister, Modem Reproductive
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Contracted through the Infertility Center of New York, this agreement
provided that Mary Beth Whitehead was to be implanted with the
sperm of William Stem, the natural father who would subsequently
5 2
pay Whitehead ten thousand dollars and take custody of the child.
Upon the child's birth, Stem and his wife named "Baby A Melissa
Stem, while Whitehead and her husband named her Sarah Elizabeth
Whitehead.5 3 Because Whitehead did not want the hospital staff to
know about the surrogacy arrangement, she listed her husband, and
not William Stem, as the father of the child on the birth certificate.-

Although most commissioning parents usually take the child home
from the hospital with them, Stem was not allowed to do so because
he was not listed as the child's father.5 5 Whitehead relinquished
Baby M to the Stems a few days later but then decided she wanted to
56
keep the baby.
The New Jersey Supreme Court found the surrogacy contract
over Baby M illegal and invalid under the governing law.57
Specifically, the Court stated that
[t]he surrogacy contract conflicts with: (1) laws prohibiting the use
of money in connection with adoptions; (2) laws requiring proof of
parental unfitness or abandonment before termination of parental
rights is ordered or an adoption is granted; and (3) laws that make

surrender of custody and consent to adoption revocable in private
58
placement adoptions.

The Court found that a voluntary surrogacy arrangement not
involving payment did not violate existing laws as long as the
surrogate was not bound to surrender her child. However, the
agreement in Baby M was illegal and invalid because it did not fit
these criteria.5 9 In addition, the Court indicated that a future
legislative change in current statutory law could authorize such
surrogacy agreements, provided those revisions comported with
60
constitutional strictures.
Two unsuccessful bills that would have either limited or
entirely prohibited surrogacy arrangements in the United States
were introduced in Congress in 1989, and although they did not
mention the Baby M case as their impetus, the timing suggests

Technoogy and the Law: Swrogacy Contracts in the United States and England, 20
SUFFoLKTRANSNAT'LL. REV. 303,304 (1996).
52.
See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
53.
See i& at 1236.
54.
See id.
55.

See TATE, supra note 18, at 14.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1236.
See id. at 1235.
Id. at 1240.
See id- at 1235.
See i&
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they were intended as the legislative response to the case. 61 The
by
Act of 1989,62 sponsored
Surrogacy Arrangements
Representative Thomas Luken (D-Ohio), sought to impose
criminal penalties on those who participated in surrogacy
arrangements on a commercial basis.6 Also introduced the same
year, the Anti-Surrogate-Mother Act of 1989,64 introduced by
Representative Robert Dornan (R-California), would have reached
even farther, outlawing both commercial and noncommercial
proposals, however,
surrogacy arrangements.6 5 Neither of these
66
moved beyond their respective committees.
In the absence of federal surrogacy legislation, then, the case
of Johnson v. Calvert67 constituted one of the first formal legal
challenges to gestational surrogacy. In Johnson, a husband and

wife brought suit seeking a declaration that they were the legal
parents of a child born to a surrogate mother in whose womb
their fertilized egg had been implanted. 6 8 After undergoing a
hysterectomy, Crispina Calvert remained able to produce her own
eggs but could not gestate a fetus. 6 9 Hearing of this, Anna
Johnson volunteered to bear the Calverts' child. 70 In 1990,
Johnson signed a contract with the Calverts agreeing that the
Calverts' fertilized egg would be implanted in her and the child
born to her would be taken into the Calverts' home "as their
own. " 7 1 In return for a payment of ten thousand dollars and a
two hundred thousand dollar insurance policy on her life,
Johnson agreed to relinquish "all parental rights" to the child.7 2
Before the birth of the child, however, Johnson threatened not to
73
relinquish her rights to the Calverts.
According to the Uniform Parentage Act, 7 4 maternity could be
established either by genetic relationship to the child or by proof
of having given birth to the child.7 5 Because both Johnson and

See Hey, supra note 7, at 799-809; Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby M:
61.
International Perspectives on Gestational Surrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary
Biological Mother, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 193, 213 (1996); see also McCallister, supra

note 51, at 308.
H.R. 275, 10 1st Cong. (1989).
62.
63.
See id
H.R. 576, 101st Cong. (1989).
64.
65.

See id.

66.
67.
68.
69.

See Krim, supranote 61, at 214.
851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
See id. at 778.
See id.

70.
71.
72.
73.

See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

74.
75.

CAL. FAM. CODE§§ 7600-7620 (West 1994).
See Johnson,851 P.2d at 780.
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Calvert presented proof of maternity--Johnson by having given

birth to the child, and Calvert through her genetic relationship to
the child-the court found that the case could not be decided
without reference to the parties' intentions as evidenced in the
surrogacy contract. 7 6 When the proof of maternity is present in
two different women, "she who intended to procreate the childthat is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that
she intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother. ....77
While the court in Johnson dealt with the standards for
determining maternity in cases of gestational surrogacy, it did not
address issues of race and economics. 7 8
In Johnson, the
gestational surrogate is African-American, the commissioning
79
mother is Filipino, and the commissioning father is Caucasian.
The opinion did not emphasize the economic status of the parties
either. The opinion revealed only that the Calverts agreed to pay
Johnson a contract price of ten thousand dollars and to purchase
a two hundred thousand dollar insurance policy on Johnson's
life.8 0 Although the Johnson case contained no allegation that
Johnson was coerced into serving as a gestational surrogate
because of her race or economic status, such a possibility is not
far-fetched, 8 1 and indeed legal commentary and developments on
the international scene suggest that future gestational surrogacy
cases before the courts may involve precisely these issues.
B. Countries with RestrictiveLegal Guidelines
Several countries follow the growing international trend
toward prohibiting commercial surrogacy.8 2 Countries that ban
this arrangement include Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland,
Norway, Greece, Spain, and Israel. 83 Germany prohibits the
implantation of an egg that is not provided by the woman
undergoing the treatment, and those who violate the reproductive
84
technology laws will be subject to a prison term or fine.
Similarly, Sweden bans the use of both donated sperm and

donated eggs, only allowing fertilization between partners. 85

76.

See id.at 782.

77.
78.

Id.
See TATE, supranote 18, at 32.

79.

See id.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.
SeeTATE, supranote 18, at 32-33.
SeeKrim, supranote 61, at 215.
See id.
See .
See id.at 216.
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France and Australia also have supported measures restricting
access to in vitro fertilization to heterosexual couples. 8 6
The French government, in 1987, decided to prohibit private
agencies from coordinating surrogacy agreements. 87 The National
Ethical Committee recommended that surrogacy be banned, and
the Supreme Court of Appeals (Cour de Cassation) found
surrogacy to be illegal because it is both contrary to the adoption
statutes and violative of the doctrine that the human body is
inalienable.8 8 France has called for the European Community to
coordinate its laws on artificial insemination to avoid "medical
tourism" by women seeking medically-assisted procreation where
the laws are least strict. 89 This request came after a fifty-nineyear-old British woman gave birth to twins through artificial
insemination, and after a Black woman was implanted with an
embryo from a white woman, both of whom underwent the
procedures in Italy. 90
In the mid-1980's, Australia began to take a comprehensive
approach to the issues presented by surrogacy, as the State of
Victoria addressed both the new reproductive technology of in
vitro fertilization and the legal arrangements stemming from it. 91
This legislative action was sparked by an instance of gestational
surrogacy between two sisters, resulting in a successful birth
despite the refusal of the first hospital to perform the procedure
for ethical reasons. 2
The legislation adopted in Victoria, the
Infertility Medical Procedures Act of 1984, declared surrogacy
contracts void and imposed criminal penalties on those who
solicited participation in surrogacy arrangements, or who either
gave or received payment in
connection with such an

86.
87.

See id
See Christian Byk, France: Law Reform and Human Reproduction, in
LAW REFORM AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION, supranote 15, at 131, 157.
88.
See id. at 156-57.
89.
Francois Raitberger, France Seeks Joint EC Rules on Artficial Births,
REUTER EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Jan. 6, 1994, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,

REUEC File.
90.
See id.
91.
See Hey, supranote 7, at 790-92. See generally Louis Waller, Australia:
The Law and Infertility-the Victorian Experience, in LAw REFORM AND HUMAN
REPRODUCTION, supranote 15, at 17, 17-45. Louis Waller served as chairperson of
the committee appointed by the Australian government to study the issues raised
by new reproductive technologies. See Hey, supra note 7, at 791.
92.
See Waller, supranote 91, at 29-30. The Ethics Committee of Epworth
Hospital refused to approve the embryo transfer for ethical reasons, but another
Melbourne hospital did perform the procedure, resulting in the birth of Alice
Kirkman in May 1988. See id. at 29.
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agreement. 93
94
states.

This act was later replicated in other Australian

C. Countrieswith Less Restrictive Guidelines
Britain and Israel, in contrast, have passed legislation
increasing access to reproductive technology and surrogacy. 95 In
Britain, surrogacy is legal as long as it is on a voluntary basis;
96
compensation, other than for minimal expenses, is not allowed.
After the birth of the first test-tube baby in Britain, the
government organized the Committee of Inquiry into Human
Fertilisation and Embryology, or the Warnock Committee, to
97
analyze the implications of the new reproductive technologies.
Citing the potential of surrogate arrangements to exploit women,
the Committee recommended the adoption of statutes that would
make all surrogacy contracts unenforceable and criminally
punish agencies that recruited women as surrogates. 9 8
The Baby Cotton Case"9 sparked national controversy when
Kim Cotton became the first surrogate mother in Britain to be
paid for having a baby for an infertile couple. 100 The child born to
Cotton was conceived with her own egg and the sperm of an
American man whom she had never met; the contract was
arranged by an agency in the United States.10 1 Cotton left the
baby at the hospital, as agreed, and the father initiated wardship
proceedings requesting that he and his wife be granted custody of
the child. 1°2 The court granted this request only ten days after
the child's birth, and the father took the child back to the United
10 3
States with him.
The public outrage that ensued was not a response to the
mother giving up the child to whom she had just given birth, but
rather over the fact that she had been paid to do so.1a 4 Around

93.

See Hey, supranote 7, at 791.

94.
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See id.
See Krim, supranote 61, at 217.
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See Nicci Gerrard, 'Blue Eyes, Blond Hair and a Top IQ,
Feb. 2, 1997, availablein LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTLNE File.
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See Iris Leibowitz-Dori, Note, Womb for Rent: The Futureof International

Trade in Surrogacy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 329, 344 (1997); see also
McCallister, supranote 5 1, at 311.
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See Leibowitz-Dori, supranote 97, at 344.
99.
See [1985] Fam. 846.
100.
See Emily Hohler, Baby Love and Baby Law, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), Mar. 16, 1997, at 4, availablein LEXIS, WORLD Library, TXTLNE File.
101.
See In re C (A Minor), [1985] Far. 846 (Eng.).
102.
See id.
103.
See id.
104.
See Norrie, supra note 18, at 211.
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the same time as the Baby Cotton Case, it became public
knowledge that American surrogacy organizations were recruiting
surrogates in Britain.1 0 5 The prospect of commercial surrogacy
swept the government into action, and as a result, the Parliament
instituted national surrogacy legislation.10 6
In response to the public outcry over the Baby Cotton Case,
the proposed recommendations were packaged into an act that
was rushed through Parliament without the benefit of any

amendments.1 0 7 Although the suggestions of the Warnock

Committee did become law, as embodied in the Surrogacy
Arrangements Act of 1985, the effort was only partially
successful, as the resulting measures sanctioned only third
parties that engaged in commercial surrogacy arrangements.1 0 8
Sanctions are not imposed for private transactions.1 0 9 However, a
government-appointed review committee is currently considering
a ban on all payments to surrogate mothers and the
establishment of an organization to monitor surrogacy
arrangements. 110 The Committee harbors concerns over the
tighter regulation of surrogacy arrangements, as the regulation
might be seen as an endorsement of surrogacy and result in
Britain becoming the European center for surrogacy because of
the more stringent prohibitions on these arrangements in other
European countries. 1 1 '
Although cognizant of the publicity given to surrogate
motherhood in the late 1970s, Canadian citizens had not addressed
the potential for such surrogate agreements in their country until
1982, when a couple from a Toronto suburb arranged for an

105.

See id.

106. See id.; see also supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text
(discussing the facts of the Baby Cotton Case).

107. See Norrie, supranote 18, at 211. The Baby Cotton Case was decided
on January 4, 1985, soon to be followed by the Surrogacy Arrangements Act,
which became effective on July 16, 1985. See id. The measure was "unashamedly

a stop-gap measure and there is no doubt that the Government was panicked into

legislative action by a vociferous media and populist demand." Id. (quoting

Freeman, Current Law Annotations: Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985, c. 49).
108. See McCallister, supranote 51, at 312; Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 97,.
at 345. Parties, therefore, are free to enter into surrogacy contracts without thirdparty representation. See Leibowitz-Dori, supranote 97, at 345. Contrary to its
intent, then, the adopted legislation might actually encourage financially needy
women to enter into such contracts without legal, medical, and psychological
assistance. See McCallister, supra note 51, at 315; Leibowitz-Dori, supranote 97,

at 345.
109.

See McCallister, supranote 51, at 315.

110.

See David Fletcher, Surrogacy Pay to Mothers May Be Banned, DAiLY
TELEGRAPH (London), Oct. 10, 1997, at 7, available in LEXTS, NEWS Library,

TXTNWS File.
111.

See id.
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American attorney to assist them in negotiating an agreement with a
surrogate mother in the United States. 1 12 A Florida woman who, in
return for payment, agreed to serve as the couple's surrogate,
successfully conceived from the commissioning husband's sperm and
gave birth to a child in a Canadian hospital. 1 13 The surrogate left the
child at the hospital as agreed, but the hospital staff refused to allow
the husband of the commissioning couple to take custody,
4
maintaining that the child had been abandoned by its mother."1
After the husband obtained custody of the child through adoption,
the Ministry concluded that no legal action could be taken against
the couple. 115 This lack of action was consequently viewed as an
indication that surrogacy agreements were lawful. 1 16 Questions
concerning the legality of surrogate arrangements were soon directed
to the Ontario Law Reform Commission (OLRC) as part of its Project
on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters. 1 17 The
report of the OLRC advocated that surrogate arrangements be
legitimized and facilitated pursuant to provincial regulation." 8 aWhile
the OLRC proposals were, as the name suggests, limited in
application to Ontario, they could also serve as a foundation for
legislation at the national level. 119
Although Canada has not passed legislation facilitating
access to surrogacy, "preconception arrangements" as they are
called, are not specifically prohibited anywhere in the country
except the province of Quebec.' 2 0
In 1989, the Canadian
government formed a national task force, the Royal Commission
on New Reproductive Technologies, to suggest guidelines for
dealing with surrogacy and other bioethical issues. 12 1 After a
four-year study, the Commission's 1993 report recommended a
ban on commercial surrogacy and suggested accompanying
criminal
sanctions
on
intermediaries
participating
in
preconception
arrangements. 12 2
Bill
C-47,
the
Human
Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Act, which would ban

112.
113.

See Dickens, supranote 15, at 48.
See id.

114.
See icL
115.
Seeid. at48-50.
116.
See id.
117.
See id. at 47-48, 51-52.
118.
See Arthur Serratelli, Note, Surrogate Motherhood Contracts:Should the
British or CanadianModel FYl the U.S. Legislative VacuumP, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INTL
L. & EcON. 633, 634 (1993).
119.
Seeid.at634.
120.
See Dennis Bueckert, Growing Rent-A-Womb Business Proves Profitable

for Some Buying Baby, EDMONTON J., Aug. 31, 1994, at A3, available in WESTLAW,
PAPERSCAN database.
121.
See Krim, supranote 61, at 216-17.
122.

Seeid. at 217.
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both commercial surrogacy and the selling of eggs and sperm, is
being rushed through Parliament in response to the successful
cloning of sheep because it also contains provisions that would
12 3
prohibit human cloning.
Israel, like Canada and Britain, also designated a committee
to suggest changes to its fertility laws. 124 Released in 1994, the
Committee's report proposed the legalization of surrogate
motherhood.125 Based on these recommendations, the Israeli
Parliament's passage of a bill in 1996 to legalize surrogacy
agreements made Israel the fist country to have a nationwide
12 6
policy addressing surrogacy.

IV. TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES PRESENTED BY
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
Traditional and gestational surrogacy arrangements that
have been negotiated between individuals in different countries
point to both the potential and reality of exploitation.
The
absence of an international policy regulating transnational
surrogacy arrangements, combined with varying policies in
individual countries, creates the possibility of inequity and
overreaching in surrogacy. Debate centers around two distinct
issues: commercialization, or the fact that a surrogate is paid for
her services, and exploitation, which is the idea that surrogates
are paid too little for their services.
Resolving this struggle
requires a reconciliation of competing ethical and economic
considerations.
A. Examples of Inequity and Overreachingin GestationalSurrogacy
Examples of surrogacy arrangements making headlines
around the world illustrate the considerations and potential
complications inherent in these situations. One such agreement
resulted in three "mothers" on both sides of the Pacific Ocean: the
Chinese-American student who donated the egg, the Caucasian-

123.
See Woolly Thinking: Canada Shouldn't Ban Genetic Research,
VANCOUVER SUN, Apr. 2, 1997, at A12, available in WESTLAW, PAPERSCAN

database.
124.
125.

See Krim, supranote 61, at 218.
See id.

126. See id. at 219. The legislation would require the surrogate and the
commissioning couple to sign a contract, which would then be subject to approval
by a committee appointed by the health minister. See id. The sperm must be
furnished by the commissioning father, and the surrogate may be compensated

for her suffering, time, legal expenses, and insurance. See id.
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American woman into whom the egg was implanted, and the legal
Japanese mother whose husband's sperm was airlifted to the
United States for implantation. 12 7 Not only are transnational
surrogacy arrangements a reality, but some individuals have
already designed plans to profit from these arrangements. A
British adoption specialist, for example, reportedly plans to set up
a "baby farm" in Hungary on which Eastern European women,
supposedly victims of ethnic cleansing, would be impregnated
with sperm from American men.1 2 8 Taking advantage of lenient
U.S. surrogacy laws, the broker then planned to bring the
surrogates to the United States during the later stages of
pregnancy to give birth to their children in American clinics. 12 9
Reports of such transnational surrogacy arrangements
originate from countries around the world. The President of the
Bioethics Foundation announced plans to open a surrogacy
center in Mexico that would supply clients to couples in the
United States.1 3 0 In 1995, Polish newspapers solicited women to
serve as surrogates for infertile couples in Holland, Belgium, and
Germany; the fee for serving as a surrogate is estimated to be the
equivalent of two years' salary for the average Pole.1 3 1 In
addition, Guatemalan police report that child-buyers in their
country arrange for prostitutes and young women in need to serve
as surrogates. 13 2 A woman from Chandigarh, India, also sparked
debate in her country when she announced her desire to raise
money for medical help for her paralyzed husband by renting out
her womb for fifty thousand rupees.l13 A doctor with a Taiwanese
medical association asserts that his country's ban on surrogate
contracts forces infertile women to seek assistance abroad,
resulting in Taiwanese women comprising the second largest

127. See Three 'Mothers" to Have Single Baby, MAINICHI DAILY NEws, Nov. 18,
1994, at 12, availablein LEXIS, WORLD Library, MAINWS File.
128.
Leonard Doyle, Dealerin BabiesPlanned a Global Market, INDEPENDENT
(London), Mar. 18, 1995, at 5, availablein LEXIS, NEws Library, INDPNT File.
129.
See id. His business plans also included networking with service
providers worldwide to establish additional surrogacy centers in both Cyprus and
Russia. See id
130.
See Janice G. Raymond, Women as Wombs: International Traffic in
Reproduction, Ms., May/June 1991, at 28, 31.
131.
See Abi Daruvala, Poles Hired as Surrogate Mums in Illegal Trade,
INDEPENDENT (London), June 4, 1995, at 16, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
INDPNT File.
132.
See F. Colindres & C. Morales, Guatemala: Babies for Sale, WORLD
PRESS REv., May 1994, at 45, availablein LEXIS, NEWS Library, ASAPiI File.
133.
See Pay Money, Have Baby, HINDu, July 27, 1997, at 25, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, HINDU File.
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group of customers at a California facility that provides surrogate
13 4
services.
The director of the largest surrogacy clinic in the world,
Surrogate Parenting and Egg Donation Incorporated, based in
Beverly Hills, California, has reportedly negotiated, or at least
attempted to negotiate, surrogacy agreements between British
135
couples and surrogates from his clinic in the United States.
Because Britain prohibits commercial surrogacy contracts, the
director of the American clinic scheduled a meeting at a secret
London location with British couples interested in traveling to
California to hire a surrogate mother for forty thousand
pounds. 136 The director was undeterred by the prospect of being
arrested for violating the Surrogacy Arrangement Act of 1985,
contending that he would merely be hosting an educational
13
seminar for couples who had personally contacted him. 7
An early, but poorly-publicized case of a transnational
138
surrogacy arrangement resulted in the case of Muftoz v. Hart.
At the time, it was the first known arrangement in which a
socioeconomically disadvantaged woman served as a surrogate for
an American couple.139 Here, Alejandra Mufioz, a nineteen-yearold Mexican woman, was illegally brought into the United States
1
to be impregnated with the sperm of her cousin's husband. 40
Nattie and Mario Haro, the commissioning couple, maintained
that Mufioz agreed to conceive and carry the child, which she
would give to the Haros at birth. 141 Mufioz, however, contended
that she agreed only to be inseminated with Mario's sperm and to
carry the fetus for a few weeks, at which time it would be
transferred to Nattie's uterus for the remainder of its

134.

See Ken Chiu, Infertile Women Want Ban on Surrogate Mothers Lifted,

FREE CHINA J., May 17, 1996, at 4, available in 1996 WL 8019588. This ban,
combined with the ostracism infertile women feel in Chinese society, makes
surrogacy their only option. See id.
135.
See Revill, supra note 34, at 18. Of the eight programs in the United
States that coordinate surrogate birthing arrangements, the Center for Surrogate

Parenting in Beverly Hills, California, has been in operation the longest, arranging
the births of more than 400 babies. See More Parents Choosing Surrogate
Motherhood as an Option (CNN television broadcast, May 11, 1996).
136.
See Revill, supranote 34, at 18.
137.
See id.
138.
SeeTATE, supranote 18, at 20.
139.
See Patrick McDonnell, Surrogate Motherhood Draws New Fire; U.S.
Case Raises Spectre of Third World Poor Becoming 'Baby Factories'for the Rich,
MONTREAL GAZETTE, Jan. 6, 1989, at C9, available in 1989 WL 5643529.
140.
See Uma Narayan, The 'Gift" of a Child. Commercial Surrogacy, Gift
Surrogacy, and Motherhood, in EXPECTING TROUBLE 177, 180 (Patricia Boling ed.,

1995).
141.

SeeTATE, supranote 18, at 21.
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development.142
As a result of this confusion, Nattie Haro
produced a handwritten document that she asked Mufioz to sign,
stating that Mufioz would relinquish all rights to the child upon
birth in return for a payment of approximately one thousand five
hundred dollars. 14 3 Although Mufioz could not read written
Spanish, she signed the document. 14 4
Disturbed by these circumstances, Mufioz sought to have the
surrogacy arrangement declared invalid. 1 4 The trial judge found
that the permissibility of a surrogacy contract has its foundation
in the Supreme Court's determination that the right to
procreation is protected under the constitutional right to
privacy.146 Therefore, surrogacy contracts are conceptually valid,
and there is a constitutional right to enter into surrogacy
contracts in the United States. 1 47 However, the judge stated that,
as in all contracts, the validity of the agreement must be
determined by the circumstances surrounding its formation, and
in this case, issues of fraud, duress, undue influence, and
mistake in the formation of the contract cast doubt on its
validity.' 48 While the judge was also concerned that the payment
involved in the contract made it a contract for an illegal purpose,
as it represented the purchase of an adoption, he was not forced
to rule on the contract's enforceability because the commissioning
couple withdrew its contract claim. ' 4 9
In addition to the fact that surrogacy arrangements have
already taken on a transnational character, the international

community should address this issue to prevent a single nation
from becoming a breeding ground for babies by allowing
15 0
gestational surrogacy to exist unregulated within its borders.
Because most European countries have laws prohibiting
commercial surrogacy, and the United States has no federal
legislation addressing surrogacy, the United States might become
the center of transnational surrogacy.15s
Britain, for example,

142.

See id

143.

See id.; LORI ANDREWS, BETWEEN STRANGERS:
EXPECTANT FATHERS, & BRAVE NEW BABIES 116 (1989).

SURROGATE MOTHERS,

144.

See TATE, supranote 18, at 22.

145.
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147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See id.at 23.
See id. at 24.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Krim, supranote 61, at 215.
See id. In calling for action at the federal level, Krim notes that the

'current patchwork of state laws is no longer effective given the global surrogacy
market that is quickly emerging." Id- at 225. He suggests that the first step in
formulating policy is to initiate a debate similar to those that took place in
Canada and Israel. See id.
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has moved quickly to implement a nationwide system to regulate
surrogacy; the United States, in contrast, has left this area open
to regulation by the individual states.15 2 While the lack of a
uniform policy supports the ideals of federalism, it also
encourages "forum shopping for the most receptive jurisdiction for
a particular surrogacy arrangement," a potential danger that
exists at both the national and international levels. 1 3
In
particular, this potential increase in international surrogacy
arrangements could lead to concerns over the commercialization
and exploitation of women.1
B. Analysis of Commercializationin SurrogacyArrangements
In addition to producing an undeniable source of income for
women who choose to serve as surrogates, advocates of
gestational surrogacy point out that "[g]estational surrogacy"
arrangements allow "women who are unable to carry their own
child to realize the gift of life."1 55
Some contend that the
exploitation in gestational surrogacy begins before a surrogate
agreement is even contemplated, as the surrogacy industry preys
upon the emotional character of this situation by encouraging the
belief that "children genetically related to their parents are 'more
valuable' than those who are not."1 5 6 This belief, in the context of

the capitalist system, has resulted in the development of a market
for both infertile couples and surrogates, in which the brokers
often earn as much or more than the surrogates themselves. 157
One debate over surrogacy focuses on commercialization, or
whether it is permissible for a surrogate to be paid for her
services.15 8
Opponents argue that such payment constitutes
"baby selling" and amounts to a commodification of women and
children.159 Viewed from this perspective, the fee paid to the
surrogate is for the termination of her parental rights to the child
to whom she gave birth. 160
This argument equates such a
payment to a sale of a human being, which is prohibited by law in
most countries.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

16 1

See McCallister, supranote 51, at 313-14.
Id. at314.
See Krim, supranote 61, at 221.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 224.
See id
See Kerian, supranote 16, at 153-58; Krim, supranote 61, at 224-25.
See Kerian, supranote 16, at 153-54; Krim, supranote 61, at 224-25.
See Russell-Brown, supranote 22, at 527, 539-40.
See Krim, supranote 61, at 224.
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The basis underlying this argument is the realization that

public policy may ban certain types of agreements even though all
participants agree to their terms. 16 2 Opponents of commercial
surrogacy view the sale of human beings as a "blocked exchange,"
as humans represent commodities that cannot be exchanged in a
market. 16 This argument applies with equal force whether it is
1
regarded as the sale of children or the sale of women's bodies. 64
As with slavery and prostitution, human dignity prevents the sale
of certain services, and contracts to enter into such activities are
legally void. 165
The counter-argument, however, is that the fee paid to the
surrogate is neither for the child nor the surrogate's body, but to
compensate the surrogate for her services in carrying the child
and undergoing labor. 16 6 The payment structure of surrogate
contracts supports this view, as the contracts provide for payment
in installments during the course of the pregnancy.' 67 Under this
system, the surrogate would receive payments throughout the
pregnancy, and would receive a percentage of the agreed fee if she
miscarried, 6 8s but would be entitled to the entire amount upon
carrying the fetus to term, even if the child was stillborn.1 6 9 If the
payment were solely for the services rendered, the surrogate
170
would have fulfilled her duty by carrying the child to term.

162.
See Murray L. Manus, The ProposedModel SurrogateParenthoodAct: A
Legislative Response to the Challenges of Reproductive Technology, 29 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 671, 696-97 (1996).
163.
Kerian, supra note 16, at 154. Objects of "blocked exchange[s]" are

those which are "so close to one's personhood" that they cannot be "barter[ed]
without denigrating personhood." SCOTr B. RAE, THE ETHics OF COMMERCIAL
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: BRAVE NEW FAMILIES? 61 (1994). Some, therefore, view
surrogacy as a "blocked exchange" because it assigns a market value to renting a
womb and obtaining a child, thereby violating human dignity. See Kerian, supra
note 16, at 154.
164.
See RAE, supranote 163, at 54.
165.
See id. at 54-55.
166.
See Kerian, supranote 16, at 154; Krim, supranote 61, at 225.

167. See Kerian, supra note 16, at 154; Krim, supra note 61, at 225. Most
surrogacy contracts specify that the fee will be provided in return for gestational
services rendered by the surrogate, and are careful not to refer to the surrender of
parental rights as one of these services. See RAE, supra note 163, at 30.
168. But see MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 28 (1988) (arguing
that partial fees for miscarriages further com'modify women).
169.
See Krim, supranote 61, at 225. But see FIELD, supra note 168, at 26
(arguing that lucrative surrogacy contracts only further exploit poor women by

increasing the temptation to enter into one). Field also notes the
commercialization element present in "attach[ing] 'a Saks Fifth Avenue price tag'
to one woman because she is intelligent and attractive, while another woman
receives 'a K-Mart price tag.'" Id. at 28-29. This contrast in traditional surrogacy
is also applicable to gestational surrogacy, as it presents the possibility of creating
two classes of surrogates divided according to socioeconomic status.
170.
See Kerian, supranote 16, at 154.
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However most surrogacy contracts are not complete until the
surrogate delivers the child to the intended parents. Therefore, at
least a portion of the payment must be for the baby. This would
make the surrogacy agreement a contract for both a service and a
17 1
product, hence raising accusations of baby-selling.
One criticism of the commercialization argument against
surrogacy is that it does not appreciate the distinction between
compensating a person for her labor and acquiring rights over
that person in the process. 172 Paying a woman for her to use her
body in a way that benefits someone else is not the same as
paying a woman to allow someone else to use her body in a way
that benefits him or her. 17 3 Because a surrogacy arrangement
pays a woman for her to use her own body, the arrangement is
free of exploitation and does not treat the surrogate's body as an
object of commerce. 174
C. Analysis of Exploitation in Surrogacy Arrangements
Assuming that the payment of a fee to the surrogate
presented no problems, the issue of exploitation, which argues
that the fee paid to surrogates is too low, still exists. 175
Considering surrogacy to be a twenty-four-hour-a-day job for nine
months, the typical ten thousand dollar fee paid to a surrogate
would amount to an hourly wage of $1.54.176 Some theorize that
the average surrogate fee will decrease if the gestational mother is
not legally recognized as the mother of the child born to her, as
she will have little bargaining power over the commissioning
couple.177 By increasing the fee paid to surrogates, however, the
exploitation argument would lose much of its force, as the wealthy
would no longer be taking advantage of the poor.' 7 8 At the same
time, however, higher fees could make surrogacy a more

171. See RAE, supranote 163, at 33; Kerian, supranote 16, at 154.
172. See RAE, supranote 163, at 55.
173. See id. at 55-56.
174. See id.at 56.
175. See supratext accompanying note 46.
176. See Kerian, supra note 16, at 164; Russell-Brown, supra note 22, at
541 & n.62. This same number of hours, if compensated at the rate of a
minimum wage of $5.15 an hour, would mean that a surrogate should be paid
approximately $33,440 for her services. Further assuming that overtime is
compensated at time and a half, the surrogate fee should be approximately
$44,610. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1998), for
minimum wage as of the date of this writing.
177. See Russell-Brown, supranote 22, at 543; see also Horsburgh, supra
note 10, at 52 (describing how bargaining power is contingent upon
socioeconomic factors).
178. See Kerian, supranote 16, at 164.
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appealing option for women who have no other way to earn a
79
comparable sum of money. 1
Arguments favoring the enforcement of surrogacy agreements
point out that they are not exploitive, as they represent contracts

which are mutually beneficial to both parties.1 80 Couples would
not enter into surrogacy contracts if they did not believe they
would derive a value from having the baby which would be greater
than the fee paid to the surrogate. 18 1 Likewise, women serving as
surrogates must also believe that the experience of giving birth to
a child for another couple will be worth the payment received. 182
Opponents of commercial gestational surrogacy argue "that
the fee paid to [a] surrogate[ ] constitutes an undue inducement,"
forcing the woman "to do something [that she] ordinarily would
not do."' 8 3 However, commentators point out that the prospect of
compensation is an inducement to virtually all potential
surrogates, except perhaps for close friends and family, since it184
is
rare for a woman to serve as a surrogate voluntarily.
Furthermore, it is not in the commissioning couple's interests to
find a surrogate whom they can exploit, as they do not want the
surrogate engaging in behavior that could harm the child, or
reconsidering her decision mid-course. 18 5 Also, commissioning
couples are certainly aware that the traditional remedies of fraud
and misrepresentation are available to the surrogate if some type
of exploitation does occur;' 8 6 the determinative factor here is

179. See FIELD, supra note 168, at 26. Although $10,000 is a typical
surrogacy fee, some have offered considerably higher sums to potential
surrogates. See id An advertisement in Boston Magazine offered $50,000 to a
suitable surrogate, and a New York Times article mentioned $75,000 as a possible
payment. See icL at 26, 166 n.4.
180.
See Posner, supranote 9, at 22.
181.
See id.; Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: he Case for Full Contractual
Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2319-20 (1995) (pointing out that empathetic
surrogate mothers might derive an emotional satisfaction in addition to and in lieu of
monetary compensation).
182.
See Posner, supranote 9, at 22.
183.
RAE, supra note 163, at 56. See also Woliver, supra note 12, at 350,
discussing the impact of socioeconomic conditions on a woman's decision to serve
as a surrogate. Woliver notes:
We are asked not to look behind the resulting children to see their lowermiddle-class and lower-class mothers. But the core reality of surrogate
motherhood is that it is both classist and sexist: a method to obtain

children genetically related to [both parents, in the case of gestational
surrogacy,] by exploiting poor women.
Id. (quoting George J. Annas, Fairy Tales Surrogate Mothers Tell, in SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD, supranote 23, at 43, 43).
184.
See RAE, supranote 163, at 56.
185.
See Epstein, supranote 181, at 2317-18.
186.
Seeid. at2318.
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whether the surrogate herself is aware of the forms of recourse
that may be available to her.
Another argument addressing exploitation asserts not that
surrogacy arrangements are not exploitive, but rather that they
are justified in their exploitation because they reflect the
conscious decision of the surrogate to engage in a particular type
of work. 187 Commentators point out that a court that prohibits a
woman who is willing to serve as a surrogate and who greatly
needs the money is demonstrating a hypocritical concern for her
interests since it has no other way to provide relief from her
financial constraints.1 8 8 This discrepancy has been viewed as
patronizing to women because it purports to protect them from
doing what they want to do. 189 Moreover, a woman's overall right
to contract might be endangered if surrogacy contracts, involving
her own body, are not enforced. 190
The cases of Baby M, Calvert v. Johnson, and Muiioz v. Haro

illustrate the socioeconomic divide in surrogacy. Baby M
illustrates the reality of the disparity in economic circumstances
between the parties in surrogacy arrangements. 19 1 This case
involved a middle-class commissioning couple, both of whom held
doctorate degrees, with a reported income of approximately ninety
thousand dollars; William Stern was a forty-year-old biochemist
and Elizabeth Stern was a pediatrician. 19 2 The surrogate, Mary
Beth Whitehead, was a twenty-nine-year-old homemaker who quit
high school at age fifteen. 193 She married shortly afterwards and
had two children, but then separated from her husband and
began to receive public assistance. 19 4 Once reunited with her
husband, a sanitation worker who supported the family on a
twenty-eight thousand dollar salary, Mary Beth Whitehead filed
for bankruptcy, as a result of which she was forced to fight the
foreclosure of her home during the Baby M trial. 195

187.

See FIELD, supranote 168, at 29.
188. See Posner, supranote 9, at 25.
189. See FIELD, supranote 168, at 29; MEYER, supranote 24, at 81 (noting
the feminist fear that the regulation of surrogacy would "undermine the right to
bodily autonomy that women fought so hard to acquire").
190. See MEYER, supranote 24, at 81. See generally Mary Lyndon Shanley,
"SurrogateMothering" and Women's Freedom: A Critique of Contractsfor Human
Reproduction, in EXPECTING TROUBLE, supranote 140, at 156, 156-68 (weighing the

cases both for and against enforcement of pregnancy contracts in terms of
individual autonomy and human interdependencies).
191. See Merrick, supra note 35, at 184.
192. See id
193. See id.
194. See id
195. See id.
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Johnson v. Calvertexemplifies the effect of both economic and
racial factors on the surrogacy agreement. 19 6 Here, the
gestational surrogate, Anna Johnson was African-American, the
commissioning father was Caucasian, and the commissioning
mother was of Filipino descent. 197 In finding that the
commissioning couple were the legal parents of the child based on
the genetic link between the couple and the child, the court does
m
not address the relationship between race and genetics.
Couples who have children through surrogacy tend to be not only
affluent, but also white, as are the surrogates they choose for
traditional surrogacy arrangements. 199 A couple pursuing
traditional surrogacy would not be likely to choose a poor woman
as their surrogate because of2 concerns
about how her health
°
might affect that of their child. 0
However, in gestational surrogacy arrangements, the
surrogate does not donate her own egg, so the race or genetic
characteristics of the surrogate are immaterial to the contracting
couple. 2 0 ' Therefore, couples are more likely to hire non-whites
as gestational surrogates, both because women of color may be
more willing economically to serve as surrogates and because the
color of the gestational surrogate will readily reveal that she is not
the genetic mother of the child born to her.2 0 This situation,
then, increases the likelihood that poor women and women of
color will be chosen by white couples as the surrogates of
choice.2 0 3 According to some commentators, growth in the
international surrogacy industry will be spurred by poor women
in developing countries who will eagerly serve as surrogates for

much less than the ten thousand dollars typically paid in the
4
20
United States.

196.
197.

See TATE, supranote 18, at 32-33.
See idL at 32.

198.

See Horsburgh, supranote 10, at 38.

199.

See id. at 39; Russell-Brown, supra note 22, at 542 (noting that the

typical woman serving as a traditional surrogate is white, married, and has
attended two years of college).
200.
See Posner, supra note 9, at 25.
201.
See Russell-Brown, supranote 22, at 542-43.
202.
See Horsburgh, supra note 10, at 39; Russell-Brown, supranote 22, at
543.
203.
See Russell-Brown, supranote 22, at 543 (referring to poor women and
women of color serving as 'incubators" for white couples); see also Krim, supra
note 61, at 223 (describing the potential for gestational surrogacy, but not
traditional surrogacy, to create a two-tiered class of women, with socioeconomic
status serving as the dividing line).
204.
See GENA CoREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM
ARTmciAL INSEMNATON TO ART FicIAL WOMBS 214 (1985); see also JANICE G. RAYMOND,
WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE BATrLE OVER WOMEN'S
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Socioeconomic factors again played a 'role in Mufioz v. Haro,
as Mufioz, the surrogate, was a Mexican national, had entered the
United States illegally, and could not speak English.20 5 She had
given birth to a child while still a teenager, was unmarried, lived
with her parents, and supported both herself and her child
through a cleaning job at a bank. 2 °6 The commissioning couple,
however, was married, and the husband was a math and science
teacher.2 0 7 In this arrangement, the commissioning couple
2 08
offered to pay the surrogate one thousand five hundred dollars.
Mufioz v. Haro, then, exemplifies the disproportionality of payment
currently possible in gestational surrogacy arrangements.
While surrogacy brokers will have to abide by domestic laws,
both state and national, they will inevitably resort to canvassing
the globe for the countries with the least restrictive
regulations. 20 9 Some commentators have suggested that if the
woman is only going to serve as an "incubator" (gestational
surrogate), then payment for her services would be lower than if
she contributed half of the child's genetic material (as with a
traditional surrogate).2 1 0 Fees paid to gestational surrogates
would also vary according to country, but the potential for abuse
exists. Some speculations have arisen that Mexican-Americans,
for example, would be willing to serve as surrogates for five
be surrogates
thousand dollars, and Mexicans would be willing2 to
11
for as little as two thousand five hundred dollars.
V. EXISTING FRAMEWORKS THAT COULD BE USED
TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE
The idea of an international market in surrogacy is intuitively
troublesome-perhaps because the traditional attributes of
consumer transactions like prices, advertising, and the extension
of credit seem inappropriate in the context of reproductive

FREEDOM 140-44 (1993) (comparing reproductive trafficking with the sexual trafficking
which is established in certain regions around the world).
205. See TATE, supranote 18, at 20.
206. See id. at 21.

207.

See id.

208.
209.

See ANDREWS, supranote 143, at 115, 116.
See Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 97, at 334 n.30.

210.

Gena Corea, The Reproductive Brothel, in MAN-MADE WOMEN 38, 43

(1985) (citing VANCE PACKARD, THE PEOPLE SHAPERS 268-69 (1979)).

211. See id. The president of a U.S. surrogacy agency allegedly asserted
that "[i]f we could cross international lines, then $1,000 is a significant sum of
money, whereas here [in the U.S.], it's just a week or a month's wages." See id.at
44. When asked which countries he planned to target, the broker indicated a
preference for Central America. See id. at 43-44.
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services. 2 12 Differences in prices paid to surrogates could fall
along racial lines, thereby relegating poor women to an oppressed
occupation. 2 13 Because a market free of regulation does nothing
to prevent future discrimination or rectify existing discrimination,
legal supervision is necessary to protect the interests of
2 14
surrogates involved in surrogacy arrangements.
Because of the widely different approaches individual
countries have taken in regulating surrogacy arrangements within
their borders, it is unlikely that an international agreement
recognizing surrogacy will be adopted in the near future.21 5
However, individual aspects of this arrangement are governed by
international declarations and conventions, which, when
assimilated, form a foundation for future action.
Until the
international community can formulate a comprehensive policy
on surrogacy arrangements that extend beyond the borders of an
individual country, principles found in existing documents may
be applied to surrogacy arrangements to ensure basic protections
for surrogates.
The first step in regulating transnational gestational
surrogacy arrangements is to recognize a woman's right to serve
as a gestational surrogate. 21 6 Next comes a recognition of not
only the right to receive compensation for serving as a
surrogate, 21 7 but also the right to receive adequate compensation.
An analysis of current adoption provisions also suggests a useful
framework for structuring an international policy on gestational
surrogacy. The foundational principles for such regulation may
be found in existing United Nations documents and other
international agreements.
A. Fourth World Conference on Women
A woman's right to serve as a gestational surrogate derives
from her right to decide whether to procreate.2 1 8 The United

212.
213.

See SHALEV, supranote 1, at 159.
See id.

214. See id.; see also Krim, supra note 61, at 226 (articulating the need for
the United States to work with other nations in developing an international
regulatory policy because "[a]s long as one country allows for unregulated
surrogacy, the threat of baby traffcking and exploitation of women will exist").

215.

See Leibowitz-Dori, supranote 97, at 350.

216.

See id. at 346.

217.
See iL at 347.
218.
See id. (discussing the fact that a woman's right to procreate "was first
declared a private human right in 1968 in the Proclamation of Teheran").
Reproductive rights were also noted in the 1969 Declaration on Social Progress
and Development, however, the right to decide the number and spacing of one's
children did not become enforceable until the 1981 ratification of the Convention
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Nation's dedication to this principle was recently expressed in the
Fourth World Conference on Women. 21 9 The Conference Report
states that women have the right to the highest possible level of
health, including reproductive health. 2 20 "Reproductive health
therefore implies that people.., have the capability to reproduce
22 1
and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so."
Further, men and women are to have access to methods of family
planning of their choice, as well as to "other methods of their
choice for the regulation of fertility which are not against the
law."22 2 To accomplish this, people should be guaranteed certain

already-recognized human rights, such as the right to "decide
freely and responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of their
children," making their reproductive
decisions
free of
22 3
discrimination and coercion.
These procreative liberties must certainly encompass the
right to serve as a gestational surrogate, as the decision to
procreate itself lies at the heart of a decision to serve as a
surrogate. In regulating her fertility, and deciding when and how
often to reproduce, a surrogate is exercising one of her procreative
liberties, the exercise of which is not challenged in contexts
outside of surrogacy. To allow a woman the freedom to make
such decisions for herself only outside the framework of surrogacy
is to deny her the ability to exercise the procreative freedom she
has ostensibly been granted.

on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. See id at 347
&n.115.
219. U.N. Report on the Fourth World Conference on Women, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/20 (1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 401 (1995) [hereinafter Fourth
World Conference Report]. The Conference focused on twelve specific areas
concerning women: (1) women and poverty, (2) education and training of women,
(3) women and health, (4) violence against women, (5) women and armed conflict,
(6) women and the economy, (7) women in power and decision-maling, (8)
institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women, (9) human rights of

women, (10) women and the media, (11) women and the environment, and (12)
issues surrounding the female child. See id. at 402-03.
220. See id.at 423. But cf. Valerie A. Dormandy, Women's Rights in
InternationalLaw: A Prediction Concerning the Legal Impact of the United Nations'
Fourth World Conference on Women, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 97, 101-02, n.31
(1997) (discussing debate over platform objectives, including provisions relating to
reproductive health).
221. FourthWorld ConferenceReport, supranote 219, at 423.
222. Id.

223.

Id. at 424.
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B. Convention on the Eliminationof All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women also supports the right of women
to decide the number, spacing, and timing of their children by
calling for women to have access to the information, education,
and means to enable them to exercise this and other procreative
rights. 22 4 Further, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination 22 5 requires states to guarantee
economic rights, including just and favorable remuneration, to all
individuals "without distinction as to race, colour, or national or

ethnic origin."226

Therefore, these two conventions sanction

against the exploitation of surrogates based on both gender and
race, which is a factor that often contributes to the surrogate
having a lower socioeconomic status than the commissioning
couple.
C. InternationalConvention on Economic, Social,
and CulturalRights
Other documents that support a woman's right to be
compensated for her labor may be read to grant her the right to
receive compensation for serving as a surrogate. The International
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,2 2 7 for example,
provides that all people may "freely dispose of their natural wealth
and resources.., based upon the principle of mutual benefit."22 8
This indicates that those seeking to pay a surrogate for her services
may be able to do so. In addition, it recognizes the right of workers to
receive remuneration that provides them with "fair wages and equal
remuneration for work of equal value."2 9 This provision, then,
supports a woman's right to receive fair compensation for her efforts

224.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, art.
16, & l(e), U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (1979). International dedication to this

right is evidenced by the fact that the resolution was adopted by a vote of
130 in favor, none against, and only ten abstentions. See id.
225.
Conventionon the Eliminationof All Forms of Racial Discrimination,G.A.
Res 2106, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).

226.

Id. at art. 5(e)(i).

227. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter International Covenant].
228.
1& at 5.

229.

Id. at 6.
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in serving as a surrogate. 230 Further, the parties to the Convention
also guarantee that the rights enunciated in the Convention "will be
exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status. 2 3 1 Since the right to fair wages is
subject to this non-discriminatory provision, a woman should be able
to receive fair wages for her work as a surrogate regardless of her
race, color, or other status. The enforcement of a fair wage policy for
surrogate payments would therefore prevent the fees paid to women
from low socioeconomic backgrounds from being vastly
disproportionate from those paid to their more well-to-do
counterparts.
D. TripartiteDeclarationof PrinciplesConcerningMultilateral
Enterprisesand Social Policy
The International Labor Organization's Tripartite Declaration
of Principles Concerning Multilateral Enterprises and Social
Policy, which is directed at setting policy and resolving difficulties
between governments, employers, and workers, also discusses
issues pertinent to regulating gestational surrogacy.2 3 2 The
Tripartite Declaration recognizes that the extension of an
organization's operation beyond the national context may lead to
an "abuse of [the] concentrations of economic power and to
conflicts with national policy objectives and with the interests of
the workers."2 -1 This policy statement, then, parallels the
concern in gestational surrogacy that the interests of
socioeconomically disadvantaged women will be compromised, as
they are disproportionately targeted as surrogates by economically
4
powerful intermediaries. 23
Although transnational gestational surrogacy intermediaries
fit within the definitional guideline of multinational enterprises to
which the Tripartite Declaration applies, as they are enterprises
which control services outside the country in which they are

230. See Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 97, at 347-48. Leibowitz-Dori asserts
that a woman should be "entitled to compensation for the physical changes in

[her] bod[y,] the changes in lifestyle, the work of carrying a fetus, and the pain
and medical risk of labor and partition." Id
231. International Covenant, supranote 227, at 5.

232.

Tripartite

Declaration

of

Principles

Concerning

Multinational

Enterprises and Social Policy, Nov. 16, 1977, 17 I.L.M. 422 (1978) [hereinafter
Tripartite Declaration].
233. Id. para. 1, at 423.

234.

Compare Mufioz v. Haro, in Tate, supra note 15, at 20 (in which the

surrogate received $1,500), with Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (the
surrogate received $10,000), and In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (the
surrogate received $10,000).
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based,2 35 the social policies of the Declaration apply to surrogacy
arrangements even if they are not construed to involve
multinational enterprises. The Tripartite Declaration requires
that "[a]ll governments ... pursue policies designed to promote
equality of opportunity and treatment in employment, with a view
to eliminating any discrimination based on race, colour, sex,
2 36
religion, political opinion, national extraction or social origin."
The elimination of discrimination in payments provided to
surrogates would prevent women of particular races or lower
socioeconomic statuses from becoming the targets of exploitation
in surrogacy agreements.
In addition, the Tripartite Declaration also provides that

multinational enterprises operating in developing countries
"should provide the best possible wages, benefits and conditions
of work[," consistent with the economic position of the enterprise,
as are within governmental policies. 23 7 Economically successful
surrogacy agencies operating in developing countries would
therefore be required to share this wealth with surrogates by
compensating them an amount commensurate with the agencies'
positions. For example, an agency that pays a surrogate a fee less
than the one received by the agency itself could be compelled to
reallocate the funds received from the commissioning couple so as
to compensate the surrogate in a manner at least commensurate
with, if not in excess of, the fee retained by the agency.
Moreover, the Declaration Concerning the Aims and Purposes
of the International Labor Organization, 2 38 which sets forth the
fundamental principles upon which the ILO is based, also
supports the idea of economic nondiscrimination. The Declaration
promotes the tenet that all national and international policies,
and particularly those of an economic nature, should be accepted
only to the extent that they promote and do not hinder the
achievement of economic security for all human beings
irrespective of race, creed, or sex. 23 9 Also aimed at encouraging

the economic advancement of less-developed regions of the world,
the Declaration bolsters the argument that women of color or
from less-developed countries should be protected from the
economic overreaching that accompanies their susceptibility to
disproportionate targeting as gestational surrogates.

235.
236.

See Tripartite Declaration, supranote 232,
Idatpara.21.

237.

Id. at para. 34.

238.

CONSTITUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION,

G. A. JOHNSTON,
239.

at para. 6.

THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 285 (1970).

See id. annex I(a), (c) at 303.

reprinted in
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E. Hague Conference on Intercountry Adoption

By analogy, the Hague Conference on Intercountry
Adoption 2 4° provides possible guidelines for an international
agreement on gestational surrogacy.2 1 The Conference provides
that "[n]o one shall derive improper financial or other gain from
an activity related to an intercountry adoption." 24 2 Further, it
restricts employees of adoption agencies from "receiv[ing]
remuneration which is unreasonably high in relation to services
rendered. "2 4
Applying
these
standards
to
surrogacy
arrangements might require a reduction in the proportion of the
total fee in a surrogacy arrangement 2 " which may be paid to the
surrogacy agency, as that fee is nearly equal to the one paid to
surrogates at present.
The Hague Conference's prohibition
against improper financial gain in the adoption context, however,
should not be interpreted in the context of surrogacy to mean that
surrogates may not receive payment for their work; compensation
for nine months of undeniable labor is certainly not "improper."
An emergent transnational policy addressing gestational
surrogacy should define its equivalent of "improper financial gain"
so as not to restrict gain to the surrogate, but to prohibit gain to
intermediaries resulting from the exploitation of the surrogates
involved.
Further, the Hague Convention permits only the payment of
"costs and expenses, including reasonable professional fees of
persons involved in the adoption."2 45 In the context of surrogacy,
this provision could be interpreted to prohibit payment to a
surrogate, unless her payment could be construed to be a

240. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th
Session, Including the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in
Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1134 (1993)
[hereinafter Hague Conference on Intercountry Adoption].
241. See Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 97, at 352-53, for a discussion of how
the three objectives of the Hague Conference could be modified to accommodate

surrogacy. First, the Hague Conference reflects the goals of surrogacy by ensuring
that intercountry adoptions accord with the best interests of the child. See id. at
352. Second, it calls for cooperation among the states to prevent the abduction,
sale of, or traffic in children. See id. at 353. Third, the Hague Conference
undertakes to ensure that member states recognize those adoptions complying
with its guidelines. See id

242, Hague Conference on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 240, art. 32,
para. 1, at 1143.
243. Id para. 3, at 1143.
244. For a breakdown of the costs involved in using a surrogacy agency see
supra note 34.
245. Hague Conference on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 240, art. 32,
para. 2, at 1143.
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"professional" fee. It is here that surrogacy and adoption diverge,
for while the goal of prohibiting certain payments remains the
same, the wording of the regulations must differ. 2 4 6
Such
payment is prohibited in the adoption context because the child is
already in existence and there is no role equivalent to that of the
surrogate still to be performed. In surrogacy, however, the child
at issue has not been born, and the role of the surrogate should
be considered "professional," as the gestation of the fetus by the
surrogate is the most crucial aspect of the contemplated birth,
without which the services of other so-called "professionals"
would be unnecessary. Again, as with the preceding provision,
this may be more plausibly construed as a limitation on the types
of payments that may be given in an effort to prevent exploitive
payments.
By implication, the authorization of payment for
"reasonable professional fees" supplies surrogates measured
protection by suggesting that allowable fees must, in fact, be
reasonable.
The Hague Conference has the potential of affording the
surrogate yet additional protection. It authorizes the production
2 47
of a certified translation of original documents upon request.
Such an option would help to prevent situations like those in
Mufioz v. Haro, in which the intended parents allegedly took
advantage of the surrogate, by resolving any questions about the
248
provisions of the agreement into which the parties are entering.

Making the intended parents responsible for the cost of the
translation, as are the adoptive parents under the Hague
Conference, 2 49 further ensures that any needed translations are
actually obtained.

VI. CONCLUSION

Gestational surrogacy catches society unprepared to deal
with the ramifications of its own advancing technology. The
genetic link between mother and child assumes a new role in
birth, existing not as a characteristic shared by birth mother and
child, but instead serving as an economic incentive to choose one
surrogate over another. With genetic and health concerns about
the surrogate now aside, the barriers to exploiting poor women

246.
See Leibowitz-Dori, supra note 97, at 338-41 (presenting a case study
of the adoption market).
247.
See Hague Conference on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 240, art.
34, at 1143.
248.
See supratext accompanying notes 143-49.

249. See Hague Conference on Intercountry Adoption, supra note 240, art.
34, at 1143.
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and women of color as gestational surrogates are few.
An
international policy regulating gestational surrogacy agreements,
however, could be just such a barrier.
Inconsistent or nonexistent national policies, combined with
the lack of an international response to the challenges presented
by gestational surrogacy, places surrogates in economic jeopardy.
The international community must act quickly to adopt a policy
that recognizes the legality of gestational surrogacy arrangements
and regulates them with an eye toward protecting the rights of the
surrogates involved. Established international conventions and
declarations support the fundamental rights at issue in
gestational surrogacy: the right to serve as a surrogate, the right
to receive compensation for this service, and the right for such
compensation to be adequate. Reference to these rights, as well
as analogy to international agreements on adoption, provides a
framework for constructing an interim protective measure until
the international community can adopt a more comprehensive
and lasting solution.
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